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Aesthetics of 
Uncertainty
Machine learning has a tendency to reveal inconsistencies which 
have transversal relevance bridging computer science with art  
and the humanities. Rather than purely situations of inconsistency, 
discrepancy, or malfunction, Derrida’s notion of aporia (Derrida 
1993) describes uncertainty as a precondition of dialectics. 
Expanding on Derrida’s line of thinking, this paper speculates  
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intelligence and machine learning systems may be understood  
in terms of a new kind of aesthetic informed by uncertainty.
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257 1 INTRODUCTION
The cold calculation of computational processes may appear the epitome of 
certitude, yet there is an internal discord between the level of uncertainty in 
machine learning and its probabilistic approach (Pasquinelli 2019). While 
computation is itself deterministic, executing mathematical procedures, ma-
chine learning is a non-deterministic approach capable of producing unpre-
dictable outcomes (Lehman et al. 2018). The tension between the certainty 
and uncertainty in machine learning divulges an aporetic sense of the uncan-
ny (Freud 2003) in the process. The incongruity which arises in the outcomes 
of machine learning prompt a need for interpretation much closer to the 
humanistic approach of hermeneutics than the norms of computer science. 
Derrida argues that the exercise of freedom is predicated on aporia: moments 
of impasse, doubt and contradiction, which open up the imperative to act, to 
decide, to reason. Applying Derrida’s line of thinking to the situations of apo-
ria presented by machine learning, this paper speculates as to whether the 
indeterminacy entailed in the use of machine learning systems may contrib-
ute to an aesthetics of uncertainty. Developing this notion from the interplay 
between the predictive intentions of machine learning and the unpredictabil-
ity at work in its use, this investigation asks how uncertainty may present it-
self as a guiding principle of aesthetic applications of machine learning.
2 UNCANNY MACHINERY
What one apprehends in machine learning-generated images is often a vi-
sualisation out of uncertainty. Looking closely at several such examples, this 
section develops an understanding of several aspects of uncertainty in ma-
		®			N
2.1 A Face Which Resembles No One
Situations of uncertainty within content generated using machine learning 
are often accompanied by an element of the uncanny, a sense of indecision 
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uncertainty signals an unresolved contradiction within the process. In com-
puter vision systems, this often arises in the form of discrepancies between 
the particularities of human vision and visual processes performed by com-
puters. For example, eigenpictures, introduced by Sirovich and Kirby in 1987, 
are images representing a set of basis features in a data set of images. Initially 
applied to recognition of faces, hence the term “eigenfaces”, this approach 
entails performing principle component analysis on a dataset in order to re-
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Generating a smaller set of images representing the most salient features in 
the dataset, eigenfaces facilitate facial recognition by creating a set of average 
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may appear blurry and imprecise to human viewers, it is nonetheless math-
ematically representative of part of an image dataset. For this reason, eigen-
faces manifest a visible contradiction. Although they are reminiscent of the 
data used to create them, these uncertain images (Ekman et al. 2017) are not 
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crowd of other faces. In an eigenface, one encounters a composite face which 
is not passable as a human face, but which somehow exudes “facelike” qual-
ities. This ghostly apparition arguably contains something of an essence of 
“faceness”, yet an eigenface may conversely elicit a mild reaction of repulsion 
in viewers: recoiling from a face which resembles no one. Part of this rests 
on the fact that faces, in all their variability, are not that different from one 
another. It is paradoxically comforting and disturbing to see in these images 
that “we”, in the grand sense of “humanity”, are more similar than we tend to 
think. The overestimation of visual difference among bodies engrained and 
propped up by biology, culture and politics are in some senses disregarded 
by the procedure of producing these average images. But beyond our aston-
ishment at creating a thing which projects a human likeness back at us, it is 
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in the dataset? What does an averaged face say about faciality? Have I been 
ensnared in an apparatus of capture, hooked by the face?
Fig. 1.  
Eigenfaces by Jeremy Kun, 2011.
The eigenfaces produced by Jeremy Kun (Fig. 1.) visually pose questions 
to us, appearing as spectres of personages who emerge from and recede back 
into the darkness. While not intended themselves to be works of art, these im-
ages vacillate between the rationalism of calculation and the nuance of their 
haunting beauty. While the level of faciality instrumentalised (Parisi 2018) 
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algorithmically-analysed or generated faces and the representational norms 
culturally accepted as aesthetically desirable. These are procedural (Carval-
hais 2016) faces, intended to be computed, not considered end-products in 
themselves. Yet the faces produced, even by relatively successful generative 
adversarial networks (GANs), inspire description as awkward, creepy, eerie, 
generally uncanny. The discrepancy between our expectations of what a face 
is or should be and that which is produced using current machine learning 
259 techniques grows narrower as machine learning systems become more ef-
fective, but as they do, it raises questions as to what is really at stake in such 
forms of representation. While there is a tendency to take great satisfaction in 
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man ability, there are often equal levels of fear and elation when computers 
succeed in this pursuit. Even beyond the Turing test, there is a persistent in-
clination to consider the human the measure of machines. This lends itself to 
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due to the lack of a consistent metric, “human”, against which to compare, 
but also because at a certain point such measurements don’t return much 
information. In many ways, the questions posed by the outcomes of machine 
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itself: the design of the methodology is dependent upon on the desired re-
sult, rather than the inverse. There is therefore a level of the uncanny in the 
practice of designing algorithms to replicate human traits before feigning 
surprise at their human resemblance.
2.2  Imaging Invisible Infrastructures
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itself in other ways beyond the uncanny discomfort of machinic representa-
tions. Uncertainty may also be found at other levels of machine learning sys-
tems, such as the degree of unknown factors within the vastness of high-level 
computational processes. For example, the proposition of apprehending a 
machine learning system in its entirety is astonishing in its own right. Kate 
Crawford and Vladan Joler’s Anatomy of an AI System (Fig. 2.) takes a compre-
hensive view of an apparatus which is otherwise far too amorphous, complex 
and colossal to fathom. What one encounters in using the Amazon Echo, they 
show, is only the tip of a very large iceberg. It seems the more one digs, the 
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obscured behind the physical device itself. By taking meticulous account of 
all factors possible, even and especially those considered “externalities”, it is 
revealed how expansive a seemingly simple “smart” device is in actuality. It is 
only through taking an exhaustive perspective as Crawford and Joler do that 
one can grasp a sense of the monumental scale of such a system.
Fig. 2.  
Anatomy of an AI System.  
Diagram by Kate Crawford  
and Vladan Joler, 2018.
260 An especially compelling quality of Anatomy of an AI System is its waver-
ing between certainty and uncertainty. On the one hand, it is demystifying 
in that it lays bare the kind of system that is often talked about in approx-
imations, metaphor, unknowns and unknowables. In accounting for all 
parts of a seemingly immeasurable network of invisible, obscured or un-
known infrastructure, the researchers unmask the beast at the same time 
as demonstrating its magnitude. The sheer volume of information, in itself 
clear, gives these diagrams a level of exposed opacity. It’s worth noting that 
sharks are listed among the issues facing the submarine cable infrastruc-
ture which forms a part of the immense combined infrastructure behind 
the Amazon Echo (see Fig. 3.). This is due to electrical disturbances ema-
nated by the undersea cable provoking them to attack the cable. One would 
hardly suspect from the household gadget’s humble appearance that it is 
engulfed in a much larger assemblage aggravating sharks on the ocean 
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Fig. 3.  
Anatomy of an AI System, detail.  
Diagram by Kate Crawford and Vladan 
Joler, 2018.
3 AESTHETICS OF APORIA
The indeterminacy of machine learning systems opens up situations of 
aporia: moments of irresolution in what are expected to be exact proce-
dures. Derrida describes aporia as a necessary condition for dialectics 
(Derrida 1993, 14), as it is uncertainty that necessitates decisiveness. Es-
pen Aarseth writes of aporia (Aarseth 1997, 90-96) as a situation of inac-
cessibility or impasse, which then lends itself to epiphany. I differ as to my 
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investigation, as it emphasises that in situations when clarity is lacking, an 
interpretation must be made. If this is so, and uncertainty is a vital circum-
stance for the exercise of decision-making, could the uncertainty entailed 
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of openings for aesthetic decision-making? Some of the most entrenched 
aspects of valuation in the appraisal of art are unsettled by machine learn-
ing encroaching into the artistic sphere. The issues of agency, autonomy 
and synthetic introspection evoked by generative machine learning algo-
rithms act to undermine art world dogma regarding what art is or should 
be. For example, machine learning art challenges the art object’s status as 
261 singular, individuated, scarce, original: an object. It also questions the no-
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of an aesthetic artefact1 fails to grasp the importance of the creation of the 
systems which in turn produce the artefact. Yet crediting a human or hu-
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played in the process. In the case of the eigenfaces which were examined 
previously, not only is there ambiguity in authorship, human, nonhuman 
or composite, but there is also confusion as to their subject. Eigenfaces are 
not windows into the interior world of the person whose face stares out at 
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computational portraits without sitters, but they are practically non-rep-
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may take to be the face of another human, not a representation of how 
computers interpret humans to be or to appear (Moura 2017). On the other 
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less a depiction of a face than traditional forms of images, such as photog-
raphy, painting or drawing, which have only tangential relationships with 
the objects they are meant to depict.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Though often inconclusive and prone to irresolution, one may think of the 
aporetic openings (Anker 2009) revealed in the creative use of machine 
learning as contributing to the aesthetic properties of algorithmic media, 
rather than merely acting as discrepancies within their functionality. In 
lack of traditional criteria by which to adequately judge the products of ma-
chine learning, uncertainty may be viewed as a new conceptual approach 
to aesthetic qualities of artefacts produced using machine learning. The 
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from datasets of human faces (Kun 2011), offers insight into the ambiguity 
between the decisiveness of computation and the approximation of human 
vision through algorithmic approaches. The second example, Crawford and 
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taking part or a whole of a system. The indecision revealed in these situa-
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uation. If the distance between a face and not a face may be a matter of a 
single pixel for a computer (Su et al. 2019), we must consider whether our 
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establish new aesthetic categories in place of the old, an uncertain aesthetic 
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ideology would champion irresolution in the face of imperatives to decide. 
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that they can reveal the irrationality found in technologies descended from 
rationalism. The digital image is dynamic and not merely an electronic ver-
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Additionally, an image produced using machine learning is a part of a func-
1. As has been claimed  
by the group Obvious
262 tional system, meaning that the generated image is inextricably linked to da-
tabases, processes and networks from which it emerges and within which it 
is situated. To more fully explore the aesthetic potential of machine learn-
ing, thus, it is essential to grasp its many internal uncertainties, not neces-
sarily to resolve them, but to acknowledge the aporias they give access to 
as opportunities for new directions.
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